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# MARXIST PHILOSOPHY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES: MARXIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOME IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

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## ABSTRACT

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*This chapter aims to how Marx's ideas and subsequent Marxist-inspired scholarship have contributed to the analysis of the various forms of work organization. It summarizes Marx's basic philosophy, theory of history, and critique of political economy; it distinguishes more critical and more optimistic variants of Marxist theory; and it then shows how these ideas have been used in the analysis of key organizational forms, contrasting Marxist versus non-Marxist approaches and critical versus optimistic versions of Marxism.*

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**Keywords:** Marxism; dialectical materialism; historical materialism; organization form.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

3 It is hardly obvious that Karl Marx, a philosopher, economist, and  
 5 revolutionary activist who died a century and a quarter ago, should have  
 7 much relevance to organization studies today. Surely, the skeptic says, too  
 9 many important features of contemporary organizations postdate Marx. On  
 11 closer inspection, however, it is clear that organizations today share many  
 13 fundamental features with those Marx saw emerging in his time. In  
 15 particular, we still live with a basically capitalist form of society and  
 17 enterprise. Even so, the skeptic retorts, social science has surely advanced  
 19 since Marx. Here too, the skeptic is off the mark: social sciences find  
 21 continuous nourishment in their classics (Alexander, 1987), and Marx figures  
 23 prominently among the classics that continue to inform both social science in  
 25 general and organization studies in particular (Adler, 2009b; Marens, 2009).

15 Since Marx's time, the general matrix of Marxist theory has not remained  
 17 fixed in doctrinaire rigidity: numerous variants of the basic theory have  
 19 emerged (Anderson, 1979; Burawoy, 1990). This chapter's goal, however, is  
 21 to highlight the most basic and enduring of Marx's insights, and to show  
 23 how they have contributed to the analysis of the various forms of work  
 25 organization.<sup>1</sup>

21 The following sections discuss, in turn, Marx's basic theory, Marxist contri-  
 23 butions to our understanding of organization forms, and finally Marxism's  
 25 critics. My survey is limited to English-language publications and focuses on  
 27 organization studies construed rather narrowly, ignoring Marxist work in  
 29 contiguous fields of research such as accounting (on Marxist-related work  
 31 here, see, e.g., Bryer, 1999; Tinker, 1999) or marketing (Lee & Murray, 1995).

## 29 MARXISM: KEY IDEAS

31 Marx's ideas can be grouped under three headings: philosophy ("dialectical  
 33 materialism"), history ("historical materialism"), and economics ("critique  
 35 of political economy"). The following sections review them briefly in turn.

35

### *Dialectical Materialism*

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39 Reading Marx is sometimes exhilarating – his prose can be very compelling,  
 especially as polemic, but contemporary readers can also find long passages  
 excruciatingly opaque. This opacity is often the effect of Marx's commitment

1 to dialectics as form of reasoning and presentation. The dialectical form is  
disconcerting to the unfamiliar reader, but it is rewarding once its  
3 assumptions are understood (see Ollman, 2003 for a particularly clear  
exposition of Marxist dialectics).

5 Marx inherited and adapted the dialectical approach from Hegel. Hegel  
saw history as the progressive emergence of the Spirit (German: *Geist*), which  
7 can be understood either as the God's essence of the universe or as  
humanity's understanding of itself. The Spirit evolves as a function of the  
9 contradictions among the key ideas governing successive periods (*Zeitgeists*):  
a thesis provokes the emergence of an antithesis, and the conflict between  
11 them eventually yields a synthesis. This synthesis abolishes the thesis and  
antithesis, but also conserves what was valid about them.

13 The notion that the objective world embodies contradictions is rather  
foreign to the Anglo-American intellectual tradition: we often assume that  
15 contradictions obtain only between logical propositions, not between real  
things. However, this dialectical approach provides a fruitful heuristic device  
17 for characterizing the development of systems over time, especially social  
systems. Marx retained the "rational core" of Hegel's dialectics, but turned it  
19 on its head, arguing that it is contradictions in the real world of human  
interaction that explain the evolution of ideas rather than vice versa.

21 This mode of reasoning is visible right from the start of Marx's magnum  
opus, *Capital*. Here Marx argues that the "germ" of capitalism – the inner  
23 core whose unfolding contradictions explain capitalist development – is the  
"commodity." Marx uses this term to refer to any product or service  
25 produced for sale rather than for direct use. Commodities embody a  
*contradictory unity* of use-value and exchange-value. *Unity* because each pole  
27 of this contradiction *presupposes* the other: for the product to be created in  
the first place, the producer must believe it has exchange-value – power for the  
29 seller to command a determinate amount of money or goods in exchange; and  
to generate this exchange-value for the seller, the product must have use-value  
31 – usefulness to the purchaser. *Contradictory unity* because the two poles  
*oppose* each other: their disjointedness can put them in conflict with each  
33 other, and this in at least two ways. First, the producer anticipates the  
exchange-value of the product, but does not know until she reaches the  
35 market if this hope will be realized or if, on the contrary, the use-values that  
were consumed in producing the commodity will be wasted: pursuit of  
37 exchange-value can destroy use-value, for example, new houses that cannot  
be sold even at the builder's cost and automobiles that must be sold at a loss  
39 to move them off the lot. Second, when production is oriented to exchange-  
value, there are many socially important use-values that will remain unmet,

1 for example, clean environment, health care for all, and food and shelter for  
the hungry. This real contradiction embedded in the commodity form shapes  
3 both the structure and the historical trajectory of capitalism in multiple ways,  
of which I will discuss a few below.

5 The notion of real contradiction has reappeared in mainstream organiza-  
tion studies as a kind of “paradox” (Lewis, 2000; Poole & van de Ven, 1989).  
7 The Marxian version locates the conflict that is at the heart of paradox in the  
real world, whereas many others use the notion of paradox to refer exclusively  
9 to theoretical conflicts created by inadequacies in our theories about the  
world. We should note in passing that among Marxists there is some debate  
11 as to whether the concept of real contradiction is of much use, or even  
preserves validity, in the study of the natural domain as compared to the  
13 social domain. Ollman (2003) offers a nuanced assessment, suggesting that the  
dialectical form of causality subsumes more “common sense” forms of  
15 causality as special cases, and that the dialectical form has proven powerful in  
analyzing social structures, most notably capitalism, but has proven less  
17 unhelpful in the natural sciences.

In his ontological commitments, Marx’s dialectical materialism puts him in  
19 opposition both to “vulgar” materialism, which accords ideas no causal  
efficacy, and to “idealism,” which sees the world as driven entirely by ideas or,  
21 in the extreme versions, as composed only of ideas. Marx’s view is more  
consistent with “critical realism” as developed by Bhaskar (1975) and others  
23 (Brown, Fleetwood, & Roberts, 2002; Fleetwood & Ackroyd, 2004). Marx  
distinguishes between the knowledge that we have of the world and the  
25 knowledge-independent world around us. While all knowledge is provisional,  
the aim of science, including social science, is to discern the underlying forces  
27 that give shape to this latter, knowledge-independent world. These forces may  
not be immediately visible in the empirical world around us, but that fact does  
29 not negate their reality: invisible gravity explains the apple’s visible fall from  
the tree; the real contradictions hidden within the commodity form contribute  
31 to the persistence of economic cycles and crises. Science should aim to offer  
an account of the mechanisms that generate the more visible, empirical  
33 manifestations of these underlying forces. Marx thus has a “stratified”  
ontology, in which scientific explanation follows a path that ascends from the  
35 abstract, deepest, less visible structures to the visible, concrete, empirically  
observed world. In this, Marx is radically opposed to empiricism, which sees  
37 science as limited to discerning patterns in the visible world. And he is no less  
radically opposed to strong forms of social constructivism common in the  
39 discursive universe of postmodernism, for which the very pursuit of objective  
knowledge is illusory if not worse.

1 Notwithstanding Marxism's rejection of strong social constructivism,  
2 dialectical materialism embraces the social nature of knowledge. Mainstream  
3 management scholars often contend that politics should not enter into  
4 processes of knowledge creation: they believe that value-neutral objectivity is  
5 the hallmark of proper scientific work and that advocacy would undermine  
6 that objectivity. Marx argues that there are no facts without theories: our  
7 access to the knowledge-independent world is always mediated by our existing  
8 concepts, and in a class-divided society, these mediating concepts are shaped  
9 (at least in part, and even if only unconsciously) by political value  
10 considerations. To adopt the standpoint of the dominant elite inevitably  
11 encourages the development of theories that legitimize and naturalize the  
12 status quo: such theories cannot penetrate deeply into the structures that give  
13 rise to this domination. The Marxist argument is that the view "from below"  
14 has greater potential to generate more complete and more objective knowledge  
15 – knowledge that raises consciousness about exploitation and helps movement  
16 toward emancipation. This idea has been taken up and generalized by feminist  
17 scholars: as Harding puts it, research should begin with the concrete  
18 circumstances and lived experiences of the "systematically oppressed, exploited  
19 and dominated, those who have fewer interests in ignorance about how the  
20 social order actually works" (1991, p. 150). In a social world of exploitation  
21 and domination, we can learn more about deep structures and that they can be  
22 changed by adopting the standpoints of the subaltern (see also Adler &  
23 Jermier, 2005; Harding, 2004; Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005).

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### *Historical Materialism*

27

28 In *The German Ideology* (originally published in 1845), Marx and his lifelong  
29 collaborator Engels mark their distance from Hegel and the Young Hegelians.  
30 They advance three main ideas. First, human action is constrained and  
31 enabled by its historically specific conditions: generic transhistorical theorizing  
32 is therefore a poor foundation for social science. Second, the ideas we work  
33 with, including abstract theoretical ones, are conditioned by our own historical  
34 context. And finally, because people must produce in order to live, the sphere  
35 of production is primary relative to the sphere of thought and culture. While  
36 the last of these ideas, expressing Marx's materialism, is eternally unfashion-  
37 able in intellectual circles, it does have counterparts in several streams of non-  
38 Marxist social science. The second idea is less common. And the first contrasts  
39 strikingly with most contemporary social science, where theory is considered  
40 more advanced precisely to the degree that it is based on ostensibly timeless

1 features of human nature, of dyadic interaction, or of larger collectivities.  
Marx begins with the opposite assumption because he sees human nature as  
3 largely socially determined and therefore relatively plastic.

The *Communist Manifesto* (originally 1848), the Preface to the *Contribution  
5 to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), the *Grundrisse* (1857), and *Capital*  
(1867) further articulate Marx's historical materialism. (See Cohen (1978) for a  
7 particularly clear exposition of historical materialism.) If production is primary  
and if human production is by nature collective rather than individual, then the  
9 most basic structure of society is its "mode of production." (Concrete societies  
often embody residues of earlier modes alongside their dominant mode: for  
11 example, capitalism is dominant in India today, but coexists with feudalism.)  
Modes of production are defined by two sets of relations. "Forces of  
13 production" are humanity's relations with the natural world, composed of  
material "means of production" (equipment, technology, raw materials) and  
15 human productive capacities (skills, etc.). "Relations of production" define the  
distribution across social categories ("classes") of rights to ownership and  
17 control over these means of production. In the capitalist mode of production,  
for example, capitalists own the means of production and compete in product  
19 markets to sell their commodities, and workers own nothing but their labor  
power and compete in the labor market to earn a wage. On top of this "base"  
21 of forces and relations of production sits a "superstructure" of culture,  
religion, law, and government. This superstructure is the means by which the  
23 ruling class maintains its domination and attempts to moderate its internal  
conflicts. Marx's materialism leads him to see causality flowing mainly upward,  
25 from forces to relations of production, and from base to superstructure, but he  
acknowledges the importance too of downward causal paths, especially in  
27 shorter term and for more localized settings.

Marx is famous for the *Communist Manifesto's* assertion that "The  
29 history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle." There  
is little specifically Marxist about a perspective on history that highlights  
31 conflict and struggle: Marxism is distinctive in (a) privileging class conflict  
where much non-Marxist history devotes more attention to international  
33 and intraclass conflict among factions within the ruling class, (b) seeing this  
class conflict as taking different forms depending on the structure of the  
35 prevailing relations of production, and (c) seeing the direction and scope of  
this conflict as shaped by the real contradiction between the relations and  
37 forces of production.

The broad sweep of human history can be understood as the dialectical  
39 progression of successively more productive modes of production. In the  
European region, this progression was from primitive communism to

1 slavery, feudalism, and then capitalism. This progression is dialectical  
insofar as the emergence of a new structure is the result of the internal  
3 contradictions of the old. Class struggle between the exploiting and  
exploited classes is the *motor* of this progression; its overall *direction* is set  
5 by the vector of advancing forces of production. When the prevailing  
relations of production are no longer able to support the further advance of  
7 the forces of production, class conflict intensifies and the old class structure  
is eventually overthrown, allowing a new mode of production to emerge in  
9 which human productivity can develop further.

Capitalism is distinctive in this sequence of modes of production because  
11 its characteristic relations of production greatly intensify pressures to  
develop the forces of production. In comparison, all previous modes are far  
13 less technologically dynamic. This dynamism prompts Marx to predict as  
inevitable the emergence of a new form of society – communism – that  
15 would transcend the contradictions of capitalist society, preserving the  
positive historical achievements of capitalism (such as advanced technology  
17 and freeing the individual from the shackles of ascribed status), while  
abolishing private property in the means of production and freeing society  
19 from the anarchy of market-coordinated, profit-driven production.

21

### *Critique of Political Economy*

23

Capitalism as a mode of production emerges from small-scale commodity  
25 production when labor too becomes a commodity. This happens through a  
process of violent dispossession that deprives workers of alternative ways to  
27 access consumption or production resources, and that thus forces workers to  
exchange their capacity to work for a wage as if this capacity too were a  
commodity produced for sale on a market. Capitalist relations of production  
29 are therefore defined by two more specific relations: a relation of competition  
among commodity-producing enterprises and the wage relation subordinat-  
31 ing workers to managerial authority in the enterprises that employ them.

Marx's analysis of the capitalist economy takes the form of a "critique of  
33 political economy." Consistent with the philosophical premises discussed  
35 above, Marx argues that the economic base of capitalist society engenders a  
distinctive set of ideas about itself – a spontaneously generated ideology that  
37 he calls the "fetishism of commodities." This ideology imputes causal  
powers to commodities and to their money equivalents, when commodities  
39 and money are in reality mere manifestations of underlying human activity.  
To give an everyday example: we often say that "the market" obliges a firm

1 to cut production schedules and lay off workers. Marx argues that this  
 3 locution makes a fetish of the market in the following sense: in capitalist  
 5 society, we are alienated from each other; instead of collectively planning  
 7 our production, we have put into place an anonymous mechanism – “the  
 9 market” – which now constrains production and employment decisions; it is  
 11 true that individual capitalists must submit to this mechanism, but behind  
 13 the mechanism and explaining its apparent causal power lies the structure of  
 15 capitalist relations of production. This fetishism is not merely a subjective  
 17 illusion or error, but a (false) understanding of ourselves that is engendered  
 19 by the social structure itself. A serious scientific account of the capitalist  
 21 economy must penetrate below the level of surface appearance – where the  
 23 market appears as a self-equilibrating and self-perpetuating mechanism – to  
 25 reveal the historically contingent character of this capitalist social structure.  
 27 It must therefore take the form of a critique of this spontaneous ideology.  
 29 And this critique must encompass the more theoretically elaborated form of  
 this ideology known in Marx’s time as “political economy” and today as  
 “economics.” (See Foley (1986, 2006) for a particularly clear exposition of  
 Marx’s economic views.)

19 Marx builds on and critiques classical political economists such as  
 Ricardo. He follows Ricardo in arguing that tastes, supply, and demand do  
 21 not determine the price of a commodity (as argued current economic  
 23 theory), but only influence its fluctuation around an objectively determined  
 25 value. This value is determined by the socially necessary labor time invested  
 27 in the product’s production. Note that, contrary to a popular misconcep-  
 29 tion, this “labor theory of value” is not a normative theory but an analytic  
 one: Marx is not arguing that value *should* be based on labor input; on the  
 contrary, he is adamant that use-values typically also require a host of  
 nonlabor contributions; his theory aims to explain how exchange-value  
 works as the principle governing capitalist exchange.

Marx develops his theory of the capitalist economy on the simplifying  
 31 assumption that all products exchange at their values. (Marx goes on later to  
 33 explain how prices also reflect different industries’ capital intensities, and  
 35 how innovation allows producers to derive temporary “super profits.”) If all  
 37 products exchange at their values, we are immediately confronted with a  
 39 puzzle: where do profits come from?<sup>2</sup> This puzzle was the stumbling block for  
 all prior theories of political economy, including Ricardo’s. To understand  
 profit, Marx argues, we need to find a commodity that somehow creates  
 value even as it is being used up. This special commodity is labor power.  
 Firms pay workers a wage in exchange for the use of their ability to work –  
 their labor power. In principle if not always in practice, firms pay workers the

1 value of this service, which is determined, as is the cost of any commodity, by  
2 the socially necessary labor time required to produce it, which is expressed in  
3 the cost of the daily consumption required for workers and their families as  
4 well as in their expenses for training and education. The employment  
5 contract specifies that in exchange for this wage, workers will make available  
6 their labor services for a specified period. The gap between the value of labor  
7 power (the part of the working day necessary to cover the worker's wage, say  
8 four hours) and value produced by the expenditure of labor power (the  
9 product is sold on the market at a price that reflects the full eight hours work  
10 in the day – abstracting for now from the role of nonlabor costs) is a measure  
11 of exploitation. Given the level of productivity attained by the forces of  
12 production in the capitalist phase of historical evolution, it only takes a few  
13 hours in the working day for workers to produce the equivalent of their  
14 wages (“necessary labor time”), and employers can appropriate the value  
15 produced in the rest of the working day (“surplus labor” and thus “surplus  
16 value”) with which to pay both the nonlabor inputs and investors' profit.

17 Note that Marx characterizes these relations of production as “exploita-  
18 tion” not because the worker does not receive the wages representing the full  
19 value of the day's labor: on the contrary, Marx celebrates the great progress  
20 in productivity that allows for the creation of surplus, just as he honors the  
21 need to reinvest that surplus. He sees this as exploitation because control  
22 over the surplus is in the hands of the capitalist, not the whole collectivity.  
23 And even if an individual capitalist were inclined to share control (indeed,  
24 even if the firm is run as a workers' cooperative), the implacable constraint of  
25 market competition on product, labor, and capital markets obliges the firm  
26 to pursue every avenue for maximizing surplus – without regard to workers'  
27 welfare – and to redirect this surplus to areas with greatest profit potential –  
28 without regard to social utility. In Marx's account, exploitation is not an  
29 exceptional state of affairs, a departure from the norms of competitive  
30 market relations, but on the contrary, a fundamental, defining feature of the  
31 capitalist form of production even in its more competitive forms.

The distinction between labor and labor power was, according to Marx,  
33 his great discovery. The resulting theory of the origin of capitalist profit is  
34 rather straightforward and intuitive. But to reach this insight, we need to  
35 penetrate the fetishism of commodities, and in particular to see the  
36 distinctive social relation hidden behind the commodity labor power: we  
37 need to recognize that in order for labor power to present itself as a  
38 commodity on a labor market, masses of people have been deprived of any  
39 alternative access to consumption or production goods, and have been  
40 forced to sell their creative powers in exchange for wage by subordinating

1 themselves to the alien authority of the capitalist. Alienation in Marx's  
 3 theory – unlike most of the sociology that cites him – is thus not just a  
 subjective state of mind, but first and foremost an objective feature of the  
 social structure.

5 Marx identifies two generic strategies for increasing surplus value. First,  
 firms can extend and intensify the working day and can force more members of  
 7 each family into the labor force. This generates what Marx calls the “absolute”  
 form of surplus value. Second, employers can respond to competitive pressures  
 9 by technological and organizational innovations that reduce necessary labor  
 time. This generates the “relative” form of surplus value.

11 When capitalism first establishes itself, firms usually leave the technology  
 of production unchanged, and exploitation takes the form of increasing  
 13 absolute surplus value. The resulting contrast in hours and intensity of work  
 between traditional village life and early factory life has been documented in  
 15 numerous scholarly and literary accounts (Thompson, 1963). This is what  
 Marx (1977, appendix) calls the *formal subordination of labor to capital*: it is  
 17 merely formal because the underlying labor process is as yet unchanged, still  
 relying on traditional techniques. As capitalism consolidates, the negative  
 19 social externalities of excessive working hours and child labor prompt  
 political action by both workers and enlightened capitalists, resulting in new  
 21 laws and regulations. These restrictions increase incentives for firms to  
 accelerate technological innovation, and as a result, relative surplus value  
 23 becomes progressively more important, and we see the emergence of the *real*  
*subordination* of labor to capital as the labor process itself is progressively  
 25 reshaped by the introduction of new production techniques.

This shift represents the historical unfolding of the basic contradiction of  
 27 the capitalist *production process*, a contradiction which itself reflects the  
 contradiction between two poles of the commodity form. On the one hand,  
 29 the production process is a *labor process*, in which use-values in the form of  
 work skills and effort, tools, and materials are combined to create new use-  
 31 values. On the other hand, and simultaneously, it is a *valorization process* in  
 which these use-values appear in the form of exchange-values – monetary  
 33 wages, inventory costs, and capital investment – that are combined to create  
 money profit (see Bottomore, 1991, pp. 267–270; Marx, 1977, appendix;  
 35 Thompson, 1989).

Marx summarizes the real contradiction between the labor process and  
 37 the valorization process as follows:

39 If capitalist direction [of work] is thus twofold in content, owing to the twofold nature of  
 the process of production which has to be directed – on the one hand a social labor

1 process for the creation of a product, and on the other hand capital's process of  
valorization – in form it is purely despotic. (1977, p. 450)

3  
5 The more conventional reading of Marx interprets this passage to mean  
that the technical imperatives of the labor process are subsumed or displaced  
7 by the social imperatives of valorization. The dialectical reading recalls that in  
Marx's Hegelian discourse, content (here: the social labor process) and form  
(the valorization process) can be in a relation of real contradiction with each  
9 other. (The real contradiction between form and content, appearance and  
essence, is a common theme in Marx's work. Geras (1971) explains the pitfalls  
11 of interpreting socially contingent forms as the true substance as well as the  
pitfalls of the converse illusion of seeing forms as a mere illusion.) On the one  
13 hand, valorization pressures drive capitalists to upgrade the capabilities of the  
labor process by "socializing" the labor process, by integrating a widening  
15 spectrum of specialized skills into the "collective worker" – the community of  
more or less specialized workers as well as technical and managerial staff,  
17 cooperating to produce use-values. But, on the other hand, these same  
valorization pressures simultaneously drive capitalists to intensify their  
19 exploitation of employees in order to expand the capital invested in their  
firm, and this pressure breaks the collaborative fabric required for the  
21 effective functioning of the collective worker. The contradictions of capitalism  
do not disappear with the shift from absolute to relative surplus value and  
23 from formal to real subordination – they deepen as socialization progresses.

Marx's analysis was not limited to the production process. Marx was one  
25 of the precursors of national accounting in his study of the distribution of  
economic activity between producer goods and consumer goods industries,  
27 and between sectors that produce new value and those that merely  
redistribute a fraction of that already created value (personal services,  
29 financial services, advertising and sales, real estate). He argued that  
competition between capitalists tends over the long period toward oligopoly.  
31 In his more mature writing, he argued that workers' real wages would  
probably rise over the longer term. He argued that cyclical crises are an  
33 inevitable feature of capitalist development, periodically throwing masses of  
workers into misery and destroying productive capacities. He saw  
35 environmental crises too as inevitable in such a system. He argued that  
imperatives of the capital accumulation process would drive the capitalist  
37 system to expand imperialistically, becoming increasingly global and  
creating interimperialist rivalries, wars, and massive social disruption, but  
39 also driving important positive changes for the working populations of the  
dominated countries as they are drawn out of precapitalist forms of

1 despotism. He showed that capitalist development requires and stimulates  
 2 the emergence of increasingly sophisticated credit and financial markets –  
 3 and thereby multiplies opportunities for fraud (on the contemporary  
 4 relevance of Marx’s analysis of finance, see Marens, 2009).

5 Marx predicted – accurately – that as capitalism develops, government  
 6 would play an increasingly important role in both directly assuring key  
 7 services such as education and infrastructure and regulating the private  
 8 sector. He was, however, skeptical that any degree of formal political  
 9 democracy could change the fact that in a class-divided society, government,  
 10 like the rest of the superstructure, reflects and reinforces the power asymmetry  
 11 that defines the basic relations of production.

## 13 THE SCOPE OF MARXIST THEORY

15 By comparison with other social theories, Marxism has several attractive  
 16 features. First, it offers a broad historical perspective. For those anxious to  
 17 understand how a better world might be possible, it is important to  
 18 understand the historical specificity of capitalism and its distinctive forms of  
 19 organization so as to highlight the implausibility of the notion (as advanced  
 20 by, e.g., Fukuyama, 1992) that capitalism could be the “end of history.”

21 Second, Marxist theory offers depth in its analysis of social life. It reveals  
 22 the role of the social relations at the heart of the economic process. It has a  
 23 rich conception of power that includes the possibility of “false consciousness”  
 24 (Lukes, 2005): this concept may be slippery, but no serious discussion of  
 25 power can ignore the corresponding reality. It has a rich theory of psychology  
 26 (Cole, 1996; Sève, 1978).

27 Third, Marxist theory does not deny the importance of the sphere of ideas  
 28 and culture, but renders changes in this sphere more intelligible by  
 29 highlighting their connections to changes in the material base of society.  
 30 No critical point of view on society can be insensitive to the power of  
 31 material interests in shaping discourse (as argued by, e.g., Eagleton, 1991).

32 Finally, for scholars in organization studies, Marxist theory has the  
 33 considerable advantage of embedding the analysis of organizations in a  
 34 theory of the broader structures of society. It thus draws our attention, for  
 35 example, to the possibility that the promising advances at the “leading edge”  
 36 of capitalist development may coexist with – or even presuppose – the  
 37 superexploitation of those at the lagging edge (e.g., Thompson, 2003).

38 Nevertheless, Marxist approaches to organization studies face major  
 39 hurdles. One hurdle stands out as particularly difficult: Marxists’ difficulty

1 in acknowledging real progress under capitalism. Marxist scholarship is  
partisan: it is constantly seeking to highlight the problems of capitalism and  
3 to show why these problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved without  
fundamental change in social structure. This partisanship tends to blind  
5 Marxists to the progressive effects of capitalist development.

Marx himself was eloquent on these progressive effects. Capitalism  
7 accelerates productivity growth, which tend to bring higher material  
standards of living to working people and not only to the ruling class. It  
9 accelerates technological changes that facilitate travel and communication:  
these technologies bring people closer in their social lives and facilitate their  
11 struggles for emancipation. The imperialist expansion of capitalism pulls  
masses of people out of precapitalist exploitation into capitalist exploitation:  
13 for a young person drawn out of feudalistic exploitation in rural Pakistan into  
a factory, even a sweatshop, in Islamabad, that represents a considerable  
15 expansion of freedom. This imperialist expansion breaks down narrow  
regional, ethnic, and national boundaries, and as a result people around the  
17 globe come to recognize more of their common humanity. As women are  
drawn into the wage-earning workforce, they are progressively pulled out of  
19 the bonds of patriarchal family dependence: this trend is encouraged by the  
commodification of functions such a food production and by the direct  
21 socialization of other functions such as health care and child education. As  
capitalist industry becomes more automated, it needs more educated workers,  
23 and as a result, average education levels rise, and with this rise, workers  
develop a broader understanding of the world and they master tools for  
25 changing that world.

Most of these progressive effects are due to what I referred to above as the  
27 socialization of production. This socialization makes capitalist relations of  
production increasingly obsolete and precarious: obsolete because produc-  
29 tivity advances are increasingly a function of collaboration rather than  
competition and exploitation, and precarious because working people  
31 become increasingly better equipped to take over the leading role in society  
from individual capitalists and from the blind mechanism of the market. This  
33 analysis motivates Marx's optimism that the passage from capitalism to a  
superior mode of production is inevitable, even if this passage proves to be a  
35 long time coming and even if the path to the emergence of this new mode of  
production is arduous.

37 This socialization tendency is in a relation of real contradiction with the  
valorization imperative that characterizes capitalist production. Valorization  
39 both stimulates and retards socialization. Focusing on the latter, retarding  
effect, many Marxists argue – with considerable merit – that the positive

1 effects of capitalist development are often chimerical. Where these positive  
 3 effects have more substance and durability, Marxists often ignore them,  
 5 asserting – accurately enough – that they already receive far too much  
 7 attention from capitalism’s apologists. Where they pay attention to these  
 9 positive effects, Marxists often denounce their unevenness – which is indeed  
 11 scandalous – without acknowledging that the aggregate effects are progressive.

13 The credibility of Marxist theory, the plausibility of Marx’s optimism,  
 15 and the effectiveness of Marxist partisanship are impaired unless Marxism  
 17 can account for capitalism’s positive effects, and unless it can show that  
 19 these positive effects do not undermine the central Marxist thesis that  
 21 capitalism’s basic contradictions cannot be remedied without replacing  
 capitalism with a superior form of society. The challenge for Marxist social  
 theory is therefore to “walk on both legs” – the optimistic leg reflecting  
 socialization’s progress and the critical leg reflecting the enduring limits  
 posed to socialization by valorization constraints. The concept of real  
 contradiction helps Marxists meet this challenge – to acknowledge  
 capitalism’s progressive effects while maintaining and continually renewing  
 Marxism’s critical side. However, in the history of Marxism, there is an  
 enduring tension between those who emphasize its critical side and those  
 who emphasize its optimistic side.

## 23 **MARXIST PERSPECTIVES ON SOME** 25 **ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS**

27 This section reviews contributions by Marxists to the analysis of some key  
 29 organizational forms. Space limitations preclude a comprehensive or  
 31 detailed review, but within each subsection I identify the main arguments  
 and distinguishing features of Marxist versus non-Marxist approaches and  
 of critical versus optimistic versions of Marxism.

### 33 *The Historical Imperative*

35 Marxist theory encourages organizational studies to put contemporary  
 37 organizational forms into historical context. As discussed above, Marx  
 analyzed the transition in forms of organization from handicraft to  
 manufacture to large-scale industry and toward automation, and underlying  
 this transition, Marx identified the shift from absolute to relative surplus  
 39 value. His analyses of these various configurations have proven inspirational  
 to many scholars in analyzing the evolution of forms of organization.

1 More recent Marxist-inspired work in organization studies has built on  
this foundation, focusing on mutations in the nature of management  
3 control. Edwards (1979a) summarizes the main trajectory in the United  
States as a path from simple control, to technical control, to bureaucratic  
5 control. In Edwards' account, simple and technical control correspond,  
respectively, to Marx's absolute and relative surplus value, and the  
7 bureaucratic form is a more elaborate regime of relative surplus value that  
emerges in response to challenges to the legitimacy of technical control by  
9 dividing workers against each other and adding a normative layer. Others  
(e.g., Barker, 1993; Simpson, 1985) argue that bureaucratic control is  
11 increasingly being replaced by more internalized forms of control.

Edwards and most other critical Marxists present this sequence as one that  
13 consolidates ever-greater management control. In a more optimistic Marxist  
vein, Hirschhorn (1984) and Adler (2001) argue that over the last century or  
15 so, evolving forms of management control have become progressively more  
socialized, encompassing a progressively broader range of human capacities  
17 and of business activities. Building on Barley and Kunda's (1992) study of  
management journals that revealed alternating periods of focus on normative  
19 and rational controls, Adler (2003) argues that normative controls in the  
form of "industrial betterment" that began emerging in the 1880s relied on  
21 relatively primitive psychological mechanisms compared to the sophistica-  
tion and subtlety of the personal and interpersonal processes invoked by the  
23 "human relations" approaches that emerged in the 1920s, and even more so  
compared to the "organization culture" approaches that emerged in the  
25 1980s. Rational controls in the form of Taylor's scientific management that  
emerged in the first decade of the 20th century focused on individual  
27 workstations and their interrelations, and since then rational controls have  
progressively enlarged the sphere of activities under conscious control (rather  
29 than ex post market coordination) to encompass entire, complex, internally  
differentiated organizations under the doctrine of "systems rationalization,"  
31 and then beyond the firm to suppliers and customers in the more recent  
period of outsourcing and business process reengineering.

33

35

### *Bureaucracy*

37 Bureaucracy plays a key role in this historical trajectory, and any discussion  
of bureaucracy must contend with Weber's (1978) classic account. Main-  
39 stream sociology interprets Weber's analysis of bureaucracy in two main  
ways. More conservative theorists read Weber as celebrating the efficiency

1 of this form of organization. More critically oriented theorists highlight  
 3 Weber's discussion of bureaucracy as a form of domination legitimated by  
 5 appeals to instrumental efficiency: they critique Parsons' translation and  
 7 interpretation of Weber on bureaucracy, arguing that *Herrschaft* should be  
 9 understood as domination, not leadership or authority (Weiss, 1983).  
 11 Recent organization theory has highlighted the noneconomic factors that  
 13 encourage the diffusion of bureaucracy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); this has  
 15 become part of a broad culturalist turn of neoinstitutionalism.

9 Relative to these approaches, the Marxist tradition has been more alert to  
 the specific role of bureaucracy in capitalist production. In Wright's (1974) **AU :2**  
 11 critical Marxist account, bureaucracy is prevalent not because of its efficiency  
 but because it is effective as a form of domination appropriate to exploitative  
 13 capitalist production relations (see also Clawson, 1980; Edwards, 1979b;  
 Marglin, 1974). In the optimistic Marxist account, bureaucracy has a dual  
 15 nature: as part of the forces of production, it is a powerful social organizing  
 technology that enables the effective functioning of the collective worker; as  
 17 part of the relations of production, it is a coercive mechanism of exploitation;  
 since bureaucracy embodies this real contradiction, the experience of  
 19 bureaucracy is typically ambivalent (Adler, 2006).

The growing complexity and size of firms along with their progressive  
 21 bureaucratization has meant considerable growth in the number of  
 managers. On the Marxist account, managers play a contradictory role: on  
 23 the one hand, they are agents of capitalist exploitation, and on the other,  
 they are coordinators of a complex division of labor and part of the collective  
 25 worker. Depending on their position in the hierarchy, one or other aspect  
 will be more important; but Marxist theory highlights the extent to which all  
 27 managers are agents of valorization. On the critical Marxist account, the  
 growth of the management category represents a tendency to ever-more  
 29 comprehensive management control over workers (Gordon, 1996). Optimis-  
 tic Marxists suggest that we should also consider the socialization implied by  
 31 this growth in coordinating capability. Van der Pijl (2004) draws an  
 optimistic Marxist portrait of the senior managers in the private and public  
 33 sectors of global capitalism, and the dual pressures they are under, as agents  
 of both socialization and exploitation.

35 A key issue in the study of bureaucratic forms has been the role of  
 bureaucracy under socialism. Weber was pessimistic concerning the  
 37 emancipatory potential of socialism, fearing it would necessarily rely on  
 bureaucracy to an even greater extent than capitalism does, and that socialism  
 39 would therefore engender even greater alienation. According to Lenin, the  
 organization of socialist production would require bureaucratically structured

1 administration, not only because a suitably redesigned bureaucratic form  
2 would support democratic administration, but also because in the prelimin-  
3 ary, socialist phase of the transition to full communism, class struggle would  
4 continue, and bureaucratic structuring would allow the socialist regime to  
5 control its enemies and avoid production sabotage. To make this instrument  
6 more suited to new, revolutionary ends, Lenin, like Marx, took inspiration  
7 from the Paris Commune of 1871, and recommended that the tasks of  
8 government and bureaucratic administration be simplified so that they can be  
9 performed by every literate person rather than only by specialized  
10 functionaries, that officials be elected and recallable, and that they be paid  
11 wages comparable to other workers. Hearn (1978) argues that Maoist cultural  
12 revolution sought to create a form of bureaucracy that avoided the risks of  
13 technocratic domination by a combination of “politics in command” and the  
14 “mass line” – a set of processes that empowered lower-level functionaries and  
15 the citizenry at large (“the masses”) in their relations with the bureaucracy.  
16 More recently, a new round of reflection on these issues has been stimulated  
17 by a series of volumes edited by Wright as the “real utopias project” ([http://](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm)  
18 [www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm)). This project has some strong  
19 Marxist roots and addresses in a far more nuanced way the role of  
20 bureaucracy in a superior form of social organization.

21

### 22 *Taylorism and Scientific Management*

23  
24  
25 A vast literature has grown up around the history of scientific management,  
26 its effects in specific organizations and its diffusion within US manufacturing  
27 (Nelson, 1980, 1992), its transfer overseas (Guillen, 1994), and its use in the  
28 public sector (Schachter, 1989). Taylorism is often vilified in mainstream  
29 organization studies for its dehumanizing effects. The Marxist approach has  
30 seen Taylorism as more than a (possibly ill-conceived) management  
31 technique: Braverman (1974) argues that Frederick Taylor’s scientific  
32 management provides the template for capitalists’ exploitation of labor; it  
33 is management’s program of real subordination made explicit.

34 If, in the critical Marxist analysis, Taylorism is an offensive against  
35 workers, the optimistic Marxist view starts with empirical observations such  
36 as those by Nelson (1980) and Kelly (1982), who show that Taylor’s  
37 scientific management brought improvements in pay and conditions for  
38 many workers. Jacoby (1985) documents the rapprochement between the  
39 scientific management movement and the labor movement after World War  
40 I. Nyland (1998) discusses the strong leftist leanings of many of the key

1 figures in the movement. Adler (1995) thus argues that scientific manage-  
 3 ment represents a step toward greater socialization, since it created tools for  
 5 designing work processes – tools that are neither the privately held tacit  
 know-how of craft workers nor assertions of arbitrary power by foremen,  
 but engineering models subject to verification and challenge by workers.

7  
 9  
*Lean Production*

11 Lean production has given rise to a sizable literature, some of it Marxist in  
 inspiration (Babson, 1995a, 1995b; Elger & Smith, 1994, 2005; Smith, 2000).  
 13 Much Marxist analysis has focused on lean production's intensification of  
 work effort, through eliminating unproductive pores in the work-day and  
 15 further rationalizing workers' movements. It is seen as an extension of  
 Taylor's scientific management. Quality circles are often a part of the lean  
 production model, and these have been subjected to Marxist critique as  
 17 manipulative efforts (Grenier, 1988).

19 Optimistic Marxists add that lean production makes some important steps  
 toward socialization. Teamwork has been systematized, as have relations  
 between teams (Delbridge, Lowe, & Oliver, 2000). Lean production brings  
 21 under planful control upstream (supplier) and downstream (customer)  
 relations. Workers typically get more training in the logic of the production  
 23 system and in systematic improvement techniques (Adler, 2007; Kenney &  
 Florida, 1993). Lean production, in this perspective, is a nice illustration of  
 25 how contradictions deepen with capitalism's advance, in particular the  
 contradiction involved in the firm's need for workers who are simultaneously  
 27 dependable and disposable (Hyman, 1987).

29  
 31  
*Knowledge Management*

33 Knowledge management has recently become a popular theme in manage-  
 ment literature. Marxist scholars have insisted that in reality very few  
 35 knowledge workers can produce anything of economic value without access  
 to means of production controlled by others, that only few occupations  
 allow employees to use much of their knowledge, and that relatively few  
 37 organizations invest substantially in employee learning. For the main part,  
 contemporary management is a direct descendant of scientific management  
 39 in its effort to ensure that the key repositories of knowledge come under  
 greater management control, even at the cost of productive efficiency. Some

1 proponents of knowledge management decry this shortsightedness (Brown  
& Duguid, 1991, 2000; Davenport & Prusak, 1998), but few organizations  
3 appear willing to endow the collective worker with enough self-direction to  
develop comprehensive working knowledge (Jaros, 2004; Prichard, Hull,  
5 Chumer, & Willmott, 2000).

Optimistic Marxists are more enthusiastic about even modest steps by  
7 management toward recognizing the power of knowledge. They see the real,  
albeit modest, growth in knowledge intensity of jobs as the embodiment of  
9 Marx's prognosis of an increasingly "social individual" (Adler, 2001). In  
this, the optimistic strand builds on the assumption that all work, even the  
11 most routine, involves at least some knowledge: this may be tacit (Kusterer,  
1978), but it is often collective (Spender, 1996). Lave and Wenger's work on  
13 the concept of "community of practice" (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger,  
1998) has helped bring Marxist ideas to a wider audience, most notably the  
15 community of practice as the collective worker, and practice itself as the  
primary locus of knowledge.

17

19

### *Professions and Professional Firms*

21 There is considerable debate in both sociology and organization studies over  
whether the professions are destined to strengthen or weaken as capitalism  
23 advances. The stakes for the credibility of Marxist theory are high: Marx  
argued that the traditional middle class of small business would be destroyed  
25 by capitalist development, but acknowledged that new middle-class positions  
were constantly being formed as capitalist development created the need for  
27 more technical and management experts. If this latter trend were to  
predominate, and if these new categories formed a distinct new middle class,  
29 and if this new class developed interests distinct from and opposed to the  
working-class's interests, then Marx's basic argument about the future of  
31 capitalism would be seriously challenged (Boreham, 1983; Carchedi, 1977;  
Derber, 1983; Derber, Schwartz, & Magrass, 1990b; Johnson, 1977; Larson,  
33 1980; Meiskins & Smith, 1996; Walker, 1979; Whalley, 1986; Wright,  
Costello, Hachen, & Sprague, 1982).

35 The growth of such a new class has been predicted by many observers.  
Bell (1973), for example, argued that professions will gradually supersede  
37 corporations as the dominant organizing principle in society. Against this  
professionalization thesis, other observers point out that professionals  
39 themselves have been dragged under the capitalist juggernaut. Some, such as  
Haug (1973) and Rothman (1984), see a process of *deprofessionalization* due

1 to increasing market rivalry between professions, the diffusion of expertise,  
 3 and rising levels of public education and skepticism toward experts. Others  
 5 (e.g., Derber, Schwartz, & Magrass, 1990a; McKinlay & Stoeckle, 1988)  
 7 argue a more explicitly Marxist *proletarianization* position that highlights  
 9 professionals' progressive subordination to hierarchical and market  
 rationality. Yet others follow Freidson's diagnosis (1984) that there is little  
 empirical support for the idea that professionalism's distinctive features  
 have eroded, but there is much evidence that regulation within professions  
 has become more rationalized and formalized.

11 Adler, Kwon, and Heckscher (2008) argue that capitalist development does  
 13 indeed challenge the professions: the traditional "liberal" independent  
 15 professional and their small-scale partnerships are being replaced by more  
 17 hierarchically organized large-scale organizations. However, in an optimistic  
 19 Marxist register, they also argue that professional work still requires a  
 strong professional community – the effective production of these complex  
 use-values requires a robust collective worker – and that the nature of this  
 professional community is evolving toward a new, more advanced form that  
 Marx might celebrate as prefiguring communism's "free association of  
 producers."

21

### *Contingent Work*

23

25 Marxist theory offers some useful lenses for studying the proliferation of  
 27 "nonstandard" employment arrangements – part-time, interim, and  
 29 contract work, the growing instability of regular employment, and the  
 trend toward outsourcing (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000; Osterman,  
 2000; Rogers, 1995; Smith, 1998, 2001). Empirical analysis reveals that  
 contingent work has different effects and meanings for different workers: for  
 some, it amounts to semi-unemployment, and for others, it is a well-  
 established niche in specialized labor market (Barley & Kunda, 2004).

33 Critical Marxists have shown how these new forms of work fragment  
 35 existing collectivities. They undermine – often deliberately – the modest  
 countervailing powers that some workers have managed to establish; they are  
 37 particularly effective against unions. The loss of permanent status inflicts  
 economic and psychological costs. From the optimistic Marxist point of view,  
 39 contingent work appears to be in some cases a reflection of the deepening  
 social division of labor, as activities are aggregated to form into new  
 industries (e.g., engineering, food, or janitorial services). While economic  
 insecurity is often a source of real anxiety and suffering, in some cases, the

1 ability to exercise choice in assignments is experienced as real freedom. This  
2 kind of flexibility has some positive progressive content, even if it takes an  
3 exploitative form.

5

7

### *Network Organization*

9 Marxists have, since Marx, predicted growing concentration and centraliza-  
10 tion in industry, and therefore a tendency toward the domination of  
11 industries by large, bureaucratized oligopolistic firms (Baran & Sweezy,  
12 1966). In this, they have been joined by writers from other, non-Marxist  
13 starting points, such as Galbraith (1967) and Schumpeter (1942). The rise of  
14 the “network” form – linking smaller, more focused firms in highly  
15 adaptable customer–supplier relationships – therefore represents a challenge  
16 to conventional thinking. Looking within organizations too, many  
17 observers argue that stable bureaucratic structures are giving way to flexible  
18 internal networks.

19 Marxists have responded to this challenge in two main ways. Critical  
20 Marxists have focused on the power asymmetries prevalent in these  
21 networks, arguing that in practice these networks are neither idealized  
22 markets of voluntary exchange between equals nor warm solidaristic  
23 relationships between peers, but instead structures of domination (Fields,  
24 2004; Harrison, 1997). Optimistic Marxists have argued that these networks,  
25 insofar as their distinctive mechanism is trust rather than competition or  
26 authority, represent a genuine, if partial, socialization of capitalist relations  
27 of production (Adler, 2001). Engeström (2008) uses Marxist “cultural–  
28 historical activity theory” to explore the “knotworking” involved in  
29 continuously negotiating the cross-organization collaborations that mark  
30 the network form.

31

33

### *Families and Households*

35 The family is also an organizational form undergoing considerable change.  
36 The rise of single-parent households and the increasing involvement of  
37 women in the wage-earning workforce have deeply transformed the family.  
38 Calás and Smircich (2006) outline a broad spectrum of feminist approaches  
39 to organization studies. Their discussion of “socialist feminism” summarizes  
some of the key debates and insights associated with the Marxist tradition

1 within feminism. (The earlier literature is reviewed by Thompson (1989),  
 2 Hartmann (1981), and Vogel (2008).)

3 A key contribution of feminist work to the Marxist project has been to  
 4 challenge simplistic accounts of the relation between the realms of  
 5 production and those of reproduction. Feminists have argued that the  
 6 production process presupposes a reproduction process, that women and  
 7 men play different roles in these two processes, and that these differences are  
 8 interrelated. This interrelation is important for understanding not only the  
 9 structures of family and nonwork life but also the role of gender within  
 10 production relations (Acker, 2000; Acker & Van Houten, 1974; Cockburn,  
 11 1991; Game & Pringle, 1984; Kanter, 1977; Reskin & Ross, 1992; Smith,  
 12 2002; Wajcman, 1998). Within this broad field, feminist work has had a  
 13 particularly fruitful dialogue with Marxism in the study of technology and  
 14 the organization of both wage work and domestic work (Wajcman, 2004).

15  
 16  
 17 *And Many More ...*

18 To the various organizational forms reviewed briefly in the above sections, AU:5  
 19 numerous others could be added that space limitations preclude me from  
 20 discussing: multidivisional, multinational, and conglomerate types of  
 21 corporations; unions (craft, industrial, associational, partnerships with  
 22 management); government agencies; political parties (electoral, network  
 23 form); military organizations; volunteer organizations; open-source software  
 24 communities; churches; mission-based organizations; cooperatives; feudal  
 25 organizations; slavery-based organizations; prisons; etc. In most of these,  
 26 Marxist ideas have had some impact, and in some areas, substantial.

27  
 28  
 29 **MARXISM'S CRITICS**

30  
 31 Criticisms of Marxism come in many variants. Some criticisms are hastily  
 32 dismissive. Buss (1993), for example, assumes that Marxist theory stands or  
 33 falls by the record of the former socialist countries, and asserts that so many  
 34 other theorists have decided it is wrong that it must be wrong. Donaldson  
 35 (1985) is surely correct that much of what passes for Marxist organization  
 36 studies is indistinguishable from left Weberianism, but he is surely wrong  
 37 when he asserts that because Marxism is mainly concerned with broader  
 38 social structures and history, it can have nothing to say about the specific  
 39 issues at the organization level.

1 The more substantive criticisms attack on a variety of fronts. An important  
2 current of criticism argues against Marxist theory's focus on class as a  
3 collective actor in history, and in favor of methodological individualism.  
4 There is no denying the attraction of deriving generalizable results from  
5 parsimonious assumptions about individuals. Recent years have even seen the  
6 emergence (then disappearance) of a small school of rational choice Marxists.  
7 Two problems arise for methodological individualism. First, in order to make  
8 the mathematics of aggregation work, these assumptions about human nature  
9 must be extremely simplistic and unrealistic. Second, there is no good  
10 theoretical reason to privilege the microlevel over the aggregate levels because  
11 causality goes both up from the individual and down from the collectivity:  
12 evolutionary biologists have made a strong case for the survival advantages of  
13 solidaristic altruism.

14 Marx's materialism is a common point of attack. Many scholars want to  
15 accord ideas and culture primacy. Adler and Borys (1993) argue that this is a  
16 debate that can be usefully joined, since the Marxist argument for  
17 materialism concerns primarily the longer-term and larger-scale transforma-  
18 tions. On the Marxist view, local and short-term phenomena may well be  
19 primarily caused by "superstructural" factors, even as these factors are  
20 shaped by material ones over the broader spaces and the longer term.  
21 Discourse thus plays an important role in social change, but it is itself  
22 materially conditioned (see also Cloud, 1994, 2001).

23 Marxism is often criticized as a deterministic theory. The criticism is hard  
24 to evaluate, since Marx offers no specific time frame for any predictions  
25 (Desai, 2002). Moreover, Marx's predictions themselves are rather soft: they  
26 are formulated as trends, and are usually stated along with counteracting  
27 forces. At root, this criticism seems to be directed against any theory that  
28 prioritizes structure over agency as an explanatory principle. Against this  
29 criticism, Marxists respond simply that people make history, but not under  
30 conditions of their own choosing; that those conditions limit the options  
31 open and resources available for action; and that as a result, although  
32 agency may be a powerful explanatory axis for local outcomes of small  
33 groups, it simply cannot provide an explanation for broad historical trends.

34 More specifically, Marxism is often attacked for its technological  
35 determinism. Critical Marxists shy well clear of technological determinism,  
36 focusing on the role of class interests in shaping technology's trajectory  
37 (Noble, 1984). Optimistic Marxists by contrast embrace a form of  
38 technological determinism (Adler, 1989): they allow that capitalist relations  
39 of production accelerate the rate of technological change and that they  
40 encourage some directions of technology development at the expense of

1 others, but they argue that there is a transhistorical, “anthropological”  
imperative driving the development of technologies that improve the  
3 productivity of labor, and that no ruling class has a durable interest in  
fostering the sustained regression of productivity. They argue that the  
5 natural world powerfully constrains the vectors of technological innovation  
that can satisfy this imperative, and they thus reject the “strong social  
7 constructionist” thesis that would explain technology’s overall direction of  
development by reference to social structures alone.

9 Many feminists, students of race and ethnicity, and other sociologists who  
study organizations more empirically find that at this level of analysis  
11 identities and projects are more powerful than class structure in explaining  
change. They are surely correct to criticize doctrinaire Marxists who refuse  
13 to accord nonclass dimensions of structure any relevance, but this leaves  
entirely open the question of the relative importance of these nonclass  
15 factors in determining the broader, longer-term sweep of history.

Some critics engage this latter debate and argue that social class as Marx  
17 analyzed it has receded in importance as a dimension of social structure.  
These critics argue that the emergence of the “new social movements” reflects  
19 a deep transformation of capitalism. Clearly we need good theories of social  
movements, and clearly Marxism offers only a modestly useful starting point  
21 for such theory. However, it is not clear that these social movements will  
assume ever-greater importance relative to the class dimensions of social  
23 identification and social conflict. Major surges in worker militancy, whether  
in the 1930s or 1960s, were preceded by predictions quite as confident as  
25 those we have heard in recent years that class conflict had permanently  
disappeared.

27 Ritzer and Schubert (1991) argue that there has been a progressive  
divorce of various post-Marxisms from Marxist thought. The Nietzschean  
29 mood has set many scholars to a deep skepticism concerning any “laws of  
history” such as Marx advances, and Nietzschean poststructuralism has  
31 joined forces with a wide range of mainstream theories to assert a greater  
role for contingency and path dependence in history. This debate is hard to  
33 join: it is difficult to see how dialogue can bridge such different theoretical  
tastes. On the other hand however, this divorce may be a generational  
35 phenomenon: the first generation of post-Marxists sought to define their  
distinctiveness by attacking Marxism, while scholars today appear more  
37 eager to find some common ground, whether it be between Marxism and  
postcolonialism (e.g., Frenkel & Shenhav, 2003, 2006; Prasad, 2003),  
39 Foucault and Frankfurt School critical theory (Willmott, 2003), and  
Foucault and Marxist labor process ideas (e.g., Sewell, 1998).

1 **IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION**

3 The relevance of Marx for organization studies appears to wax and wane in **AU :6**  
inverse proportion to the apparent durability of the capitalist order. With  
5 rise of worker militancy in the advanced capitalist world and the surge of  
national liberation movements in the Third World in the 1960s, a generation  
7 of scholars emerged for whom Marx’s ideas constituted the basic intellectual  
matrix. With the waning of the workers’ and national liberation movements  
9 since the 1970s and the demise of the socialist bloc since the 1990s, Marxism  
lost much of its appeal for scholars in organization studies as in other fields.  
11 More recently, as the capitalist order came under threat from new waves of  
worker mobilization and from financial crises originating in the United  
13 States and the United Kingdom, Marx reappears on the agenda. The future  
of Marxist organization studies appears bright.

15  
17 **NOTES**

19 1. This chapter is complementary to Adler (2009a). It shares a similar overall  
structure, but focuses on philosophy and forms of organization rather than on topics  
in organization theory.

21 2. Current economic theory assumes that tastes, supply, and demand determine  
price; that at equilibrium all “factors of production” are paid a price reflecting their  
23 marginal productivity; that this is true too of capital; and that profit is therefore  
determined by the marginal productivity of capital. While this understanding of profit  
25 sounds plausible at a microeconomic level, it has proven to be entirely wrongheaded  
at the aggregate, macroeconomic level – indeed, it is a nice example of fetishism. A  
27 famous debate in the 1960s between Marxist-inspired economists at Cambridge, UK,  
led by Joan Robinson, and mainstream economists in Cambridge, MA, led by Paul  
Samuelson, ended in the victory of the former, acknowledged by the latter, in arguing  
29 that the profit rate could not be derived from any such supply and demand process,  
but was itself a function of the aggregate rate of exploitation. Graduate economics  
31 education today simply ignores the whole issue, and proceeds oblivious to the  
resulting incoherence of the neoclassical synthesis (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003).

33  
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Kenney, David Levy, Richard Marens, Mark Mizruchi, Craig Prichard,  
39 Mick Rowlinson, Paul Thompson, and Matt Vidal, even if there is much  
with which they still disagree.

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